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Abstract: This paper uses survey data for 60,000 households from 29 transition economies in 
2006 and 2010 to explore how the use of banking services is related to household 
characteristics, as well as to bank ownership, deposit insurance and creditor protection. At the 
household level we find that the holding of a bank account, a bank card, or a mortgage 
increases with income and education in most countries and find evidence for an urban-rural 
gap. The use of banking services is also related to the religion and social integration of a 
household as well as the gender of the household head. Using the within-country variation 
between 2006 and 2010, we find that the privatization of state-owned banks and an increase 
in market share of foreign banks are associated with a stronger use of banking services. 
Foreign bank ownership is also associated with a higher use of bank services among high-
income households and households with formal employment. State ownership, by contrast is 
hardly associated with more outreach to poorer households. More generous deposit insurance 
and stronger creditor rights also foster the use of banking services among the urban, rich, 
better educated and formally employed.  
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1.  Introduction 
Access to banking services is viewed as a key determinant of economic well-being for 
households, especially in low-income countries. Savings and credit products make it easier 
for households to align income and expenditure patterns across time, to insure themselves 
against income and expenditure shocks, as well as to undertake investments in human or 
physical capital. Given the importance attributed to financial service access it is striking that 
there is little cross-country evidence which documents how the use of financial services 
differs across households and, in particular, how cross-country variation in the structure of 
the financial sector affects the type of households which are banked.  
This paper uses household survey data from 28 transition economies and Turkey taken 
from the EBRD’s Life in Transition Survey (LITS) database to (i) document the use of 
formal banking services (bank accounts, bank cards and mortgages) across these 29 countries 
in 2006 and 2010, (ii) relate this use to an array of household characteristics, (iii) gauge the 
relationship between changes in bank ownership and the financial infrastructure (deposit 
insurance and creditor protection) and changes in the use of banking services over time 
within a country, and (iv) assess how cross-country variation in bank ownership, deposit 
insurance and creditor protection affect the composition of the banked population.  
The relationship between the ownership structure of the banking system and access to 
financial services has been intensively discussed, both in the theoretical and empirical 
literature. On the one hand, government-owned banks often have the mandate to increase 
access to financial services by firms and households. On the other hand, foreign-owned banks 
are conjectured to have too centralized organizational structures and to be too risk-averse to 
reach out towards the low-end of the market. While the recent literature has explored the 
relationship between the ownership structure of banking markets and access to credit by 2 
 
enterprises, little evidence exists on the relationship between ownership structure in the 
banking system and the use of formal banking services by households. 
Upgrades in the financial infrastructure have often been advocated as instruments to 
not only deepen but also broaden financial systems. Deposit insurance has been mentioned as 
a tool to create trust in the financial system, especially for “small” savers. Creditor protection 
through credit information sharing and creditor rights might also reduce costs and risks for 
banks to extend credit to larger segments of the population.  
Transition economies are an almost ideal sample to study the relationship between 
bank ownership, the financial infrastructure and household use of banking services. After the 
fall of communism, these countries had to transform their state-owned, mono-banking 
systems into two-tier market-based financial systems.
1 Countries, however, chose different 
financial sector reform paths.
2 Some countries opted for domestic privately-owned banking 
systems through privatization or the entry of new domestic players. Others opted for foreign 
bank entry early on, be it through privatization or by encouraging greenfield entry (Claeys 
and Hainz, 2007). Countries also moved at different speeds in terms of institutional solutions 
to protect depositors, e.g. deposit insurance (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2005) and legislation or 
institutions introduced to protect creditors (Pistor et al., 2000; Brown et al., 2009).  
Our empirical analysis shows a large variation in the use of banking services across 
the transition economies. Specifically, we find that in 2010 more than 80 percent of 
households in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia had a bank account, as 
opposed to less than 5 percent of households in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan. This compares to over 90 percent in France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the 
U.K. Within countries we find that the use of banking services is more common among 
                                                 
1 The state-bank systems before the transition had quite extensive networks with large shares of the population 
having savings accounts. However, besides the notable exceptions of the Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary 
with high levels of financial intermediation there was little cross-country variation before the on-set of the 
transition process.  
2 See Bonin and Wachtel (2003) for a survey of financial sector reforms in the transition economies.  3 
 
households located in urban areas, households with higher income, younger households, 
households headed by a male, as well as for households in which an adult member has 
university education and formal employment. By contrast, banking products are used less 
often by households which rely on transfer income and by Muslim households.  
Using the within-country variation between 2006 and 2010, we find no consistent 
relationship between changes in deposit insurance or creditor protection and the share of 
households which use formal banking services. We do however find that the use of banking 
services increases in countries which privatized their banking sectors and where the presence 
of foreign banks increased. 
Looking at the types of households which use banking services we find evidence for 
substantial compositional effects of foreign bank ownership, deposit insurance and creditor 
rights. The market share of foreign banks is positively associated with the use of banking 
products among high-income and formally employed households. Generous deposit insurance 
coverage increases the use of financial services among urban, rich and formally employed 
households. Creditor protection also seems to benefit households with formal employment 
and higher education. We do not find that state ownership is associated with more outreach to 
poorer households. We also find no robust evidence that credit information sharing is 
associated with cross-country variation in the composition of the banked population.  
This paper contributes to the nascent literature on household use of formal banking 
services. On a cross-country level, Beck et al. (2007) find that government (foreign) 
ownership is negatively associated with outreach as measured by branch penetration (number 
of accounts per capita), while Beck et al. (2008) find that barriers for bank customers are 
higher where banking systems are predominantly government-owned and lower where there 
is more foreign bank participation. Recent household survey collection efforts in Southern 
and Eastern Africa using FinScope surveys have allowed rigorous analysis of household’s use 4 
 
of formal and informal services (see for example, Honohan and King, 2009; Beck et al., 
2010; Atiero et al., 2011).
3 None of the previous literature, however, has used survey data for 
such a broad cross-section of countries as we do in this paper.  Moreover, none of the existing 
studies has been able to study changes in access to finance over time within a country. This 
paper is thus the first to examine how changes in the structure of the banking sector over time 
affects access to finance at the household level. Moreover it is the first study to examine how 
variation in the structure of the banking sector across countries affects the composition of the 
banked population.  
We also contribute to the extensive literature on the relationship between bank 
ownership and the use of banking services. This literature makes ambiguous predictions, both 
for the effect of foreign bank and state bank ownership. Gerschenkron (1962) claims that 
state-owned banks can overcome market failures and help channeling funds to strategically 
important projects that are neglected by private financial institutions.
4 However, a large 
theoretical and empirical literature suggests mission drift by these banks (La Porta et al., 
2002), especially where political interference in the financial system is rampant (Cole, 2009; 
Sapienza, 2004; and Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Similarly ambiguous predictions have been 
made about the effect of foreign bank ownership. Studies of foreign bank entry in developing 
countries have indicated that local profit motives are an important driving force for entry.
5  
This would suggest that foreign banks are interested in offering services to a broader clientele 
(see, for example, Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001; Buch and DeLong, 2004; and Buch and 
Lipponer, 2004). However, the most recent theoretical and empirical studies suggest that 
                                                 
3 There have been a series of country-level studies on Brazil, Mexico, and Romania, among others, over the past 
ten years. Most of these, however, use a sample that is geographically limited, even within the respective 
country. For a broader overview and discussion, see World Bank (2007).  
4 Government-owned savings banks in Western Europe were often founded with the explicit goal of expanding 
access to formal banking services to low-income individuals and postal savings banks often achieve a large 
clientele (Baums, 1994; World Bank, 2006).   
5 Earlier U.S. based studies on foreign bank entry in the 1980s suggest that foreign banks are not interested in 
offering services to the population at large but that they primarily “follow their clients” (see Goldberg and 
Saunders, 1981a,b; Cho et al., 1987; Hultman and McGee, 1989; and Goldberg and Grosse, 1994, among 
others). 5 
 
foreign banks tend to “cherry pick” (see, for example, Detragiache et al. 2008; Gormley, 
2010; and Mian, 2006), which would imply that foreign bank penetration would be 
negatively related to the broader use of financial services. Using firm-level data from Eastern 
and Central Europe Giannetti and Ongena (2009) find that firms of all sizes benefit from 
foreign bank presence. De Haas and Naaborg (2006) find that while foreign banks in Eastern 
and Central Europe initially focused on large corporates, they have increasingly gone down-
market in recent years. Supporting this view, recent bank-level evidence by Brown and De 
Haas (2011) suggests that foreign bank takeovers in Emerging Europe did lead to increased 
lending to the household sector. By contrast, Beck and Martinez Peria (2010) find a negative 
impact of foreign bank entry in Mexico on branch penetration and the number of deposit and 
loan accounts. We add to this literature by providing household-level evidence on the effect 
of bank ownership structure. 
Our paper is the first to our knowledge which examines how the quality of the 
financial infrastructure, i.e. deposit insurance and creditor protection, affects the use of 
banking services at the household-level. Evidence based on aggregate cross-country data 
suggests that generous deposit insurance does not foster financial intermediation but 
increases the fragility of the financial sector (Cull et al., 2005). Cross-country variation in 
information sharing and creditor rights have been related to aggregate credit levels (Djankov 
et al. 2007) as well as to firms’ access to credit (Beck et al., 2004; Love and Mylenko, 2003). 
With respect to transition countries, Brown et al. (2009) show that countries that established 
credit registries at an earlier stage have already seen a positive impact on firm financing, by 
increasing availability and lowering cost, especially to more opaque firms. Haselman and 
Wachtel (2007) show that banks in better functioning legal environments are more willing to 
lend to SMEs and to provide mortgages.  6 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the 
data and section 3 discusses the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  Data 
Our household-level data are taken from the EBRD-World Bank Life in Transition Survey 
(LITS) implemented in 2006 and 2010, as a repeated cross-sectional survey. The two survey 
waves cover 29 countries in which the EBRD operates comprising 28 transition countries and 
Turkey.
6 In each country, roughly 1,000 interviews were conducted with randomly selected 
households for each wave of the survey. After excluding households with missing 
information we are left with a total sample of 59,697 observations: 28,153 observations for 
the 2006 survey, and 31,544 for the 2010 survey. The LITS dataset also includes sampling 
weights to account for the differences in the ratio of sample size to population size across 
countries, as well as for sampling biases within countries. We use these weights when 
calculating summary statistics, as well as throughout our univariate and multivariate 
analyses.
7 The first part of the LITS questionnaire is conducted with the household head and 
elicits information on household composition, housing, expenses and use of services. The 
second part of the questionnaire is administered to one adult member of the household and 
yields information on that person’s attitudes and values, current economic activity, life 
history, as well as personal information.
8 We use information from the first part of the survey 
to yield indicators of household use of banking services, location, income, economic activity 
as well as household size, and the gender and age of the household head. From the second 
part of the survey we yield indicators of education, employment status, social integration, and 
                                                 
6 The survey does not cover Turkmenistan. 
7 Details of the LITS methodology are available at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/lits.htm. 
8 The second part of the questionnaire was conducted with the adult household member with the most recent 
birthday. This implies that for 40% of the households two people (the household head and another adult 
member) were interviewed, while for 60% of the households one person was interviewed (the household head). 7 
 
religion. Table 1 provides definitions and the sources for all variables which we employ from 
the LITS 2006 and 2010. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
We employ three indicators of household use of banking services. The dummy 
variable Account measures whether any member of the household has a bank account. The 
dummy variable Card measures whether any member of the household has a bank (debit or 
credit) card. The dummy variable Mortgage indicates whether a household that owns its 
dwelling has financed this dwelling mainly with a mortgage. In 2006, 36 percent of surveyed 
households had a bank account and 31 percent had a bank card, while only 6 percent had a 
mortgage. By 2010, 42 percent had an account, 40 percent had a bank card and 10 percent 
had a mortgage, thus a clear increase in the use of banking services compared to four years 
earlier. The use of bank accounts and bank cards are highly correlated: In 2010, 69 percent of 
households with a bank account also had a debit or credit card. The use of bank accounts and 
mortgages are less correlated: In 2010, only 15 percent of households with a bank account 
also had a mortgage. These levels of use of banking services in our sample compare to 
significantly higher averages across five Western European countries, included in the 2010 
LITS wave: 96 percent of the population hold a bank account across a sample of households 
in France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK, 91 percent have a bank card and 59 percent 
of home owners have a mortgage.  
Table 2 shows that there is substantial variation in the use of banking services across 
countries, with banked households much more common in the new EU member states than in 
the CIS countries. In 2010, more than 80 percent of households in the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia had a bank account, while less than 5 percent of households 8 
 
in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan did so. Cross-country 
variation in the use of cards and mortgages is similar. Table 2 also indicates that in many 
countries, the use of financial services increased between 2006 and 2010, while in others it 
decreased. Specifically, Albania, Armenia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Serbia, and Turkey saw a significant increase in the use of financial services once we control 
for the above mentioned household characteristics, while Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan saw a decrease. The increase 
in the use of bank cards, on the other hand, has been more general. Only Bosnia, Croatia, 
Lithuania, and Poland saw a statistically and economically significant drop in the use of cards 
between 2006 and 2010. Turning to the use of mortgages, about half of the countries saw an 
increase between 2006 and 2010, while the other half saw no significant change.  
Table 2 also compares our indicators of banking service use to existing aggregate 
measures of financial depth and access from the EBRD transition report (Credit / GDP) and 
Honohan’s (2008) Composite estimate of the share of population that uses formal banking 
services. There is a strong positive correlation between our survey-based indicators of use of 
banking services and the Composite indicator and Credit / GDP.
9 
 
Table 2 here 
 
We relate the use of banking services to an array of individual and household 
characteristics; descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3 Panel A. At the household-level 
we expect the use of banking services to be related to household location, income and income 
sources. The dummy variable Urban captures whether the household is located in an urban 
                                                 
9 Spearman rank correlations based on 2010 (weighted) country averages of Account, Card and Mortgage  the 
Composite indicator and the 2007-2009 average of Credit / GDP yield the following results: Account is 
significantly correlated with Composite (.83, p<.05) and Credit / GDP (.72, p<.05). Card is significantly 
correlated with Composite (.80, p<.05) and Credit / GDP (.70, p<.05). Mortgage is significantly correlated with 
Composite (.56, p<.05) and Credit / GDP (.51, p<.05). 9 
 
rather than a rural area. The variable Expenses is our proxy of household income and 
measures annual household expenses in USD.
10 In addition to our measure of income level 
we use three dummy variables to capture the main source of household income; Self-
employed and Transfer receiver, with Wage income as the reference category.
11  
We include several demographic characteristics, including household Size, which is 
the number of adults and children in the household, the Age of the household head and the 
gender of the household head, captured by the dummy variable Male. 
We expect household use of banking services to be related to the respondent’s level of 
education, employment status, social integration and religion. The dummy variable 
University degree captures whether the respondent to the survey has  a tertiary-level degree, 
while the variable Formal employed captures the respondent’s most recent employment 
history, i.e. whether the respondent had a formal employment contract during the past 12 
months. Language indicates whether (s)he speaks at least one official language and is thus an 
indicator of social integration. The variable Muslim is a dummy variable indicating followers 
of Islam.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
 We employ eight country-level explanatory variables to examine the effect of bank 
ownership and financial infrastructure on household use of banks, while controlling for the 
potential impact of macroeconomic conditions. Summary statistics of our country-level 
explanatory variables are presented in Table 3 Panel B. We average the country-level 
variables over the period 2003-2005 for the 2006 wave of LITS and 2007-2009 for the 2010 
wave of LITS. 
                                                 
10 Household expenses are measured according to the OECD household equivalized scale. 
11 Transfer income covers both state and private (charity) transfers. Using separate dummy variables for these 
two transfer categories yields qualitatively similar findings.  10 
 
We use two indicators of bank-ownership. Foreign banks and State banks measure the 
share of banking assets controlled by foreign-owned and state-owned banks respectively and 
are taken from the EBRD transition report. The (unweighted) share of foreign bank assets in 
our sample of countries increased from 50.3 to 62.2 percent during our observation period, 
while the share of state bank assets fell from 15.8 to 11.4 percent. There is considerable 
variation in the market share of foreign banks and state banks across countries: In the period 
2007-2009, foreign banks had only 15 percent of total banking assets in Turkey, while their 
market share was 98 percent in Estonia. Also in 2007-2009 there were no state-owned banks 
in Albania Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, and Macedonia, while their market share 
was 40 percent or above in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia. 
We employ three indicators of the financial infrastructure. First, we consider Deposit 
insurance coverage as indicator of the financial safety net for depositors.
12 This variable 
indicates the deposit insurance coverage relative to GDP per capita and is taken from 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005) for 2003. We updated this information for the year 2007 using 
information from the International Association of Deposit Insurers (www.iadi.org). On 
average across our sample deposit insurance coverage did not increase over our observation 
period. However, at the country level we observe substantial changes in both directions. In 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan for example deposit insurance was newly introduced, 
offering coverage of 2.3 and 1.3 times GDP per capita respectively in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, and unlimited coverage in Tajikistan. By contrast, due to increases in average 
income levels deposit insurance coverage in Poland fell from five times to three times GDP 
per capita, while in Slovakia it fell from four times to less than two times GDP per capita.  
We use two indicators of creditor protection which are taken from the World Bank 
Doing Business database. The variable Credit information is scaled between zero and sic and 
                                                 
12 In unreported robustness tests, we also try a dummy variable for explicit deposit insurance, with qualitatively 
similar results. 11 
 
captures the extent to which borrower information is collected and shared among financial 
institutions.
13 For the period 2003-2005, this indicator ranges from zero in eight countries 
without credit registry to five in Bosnia, Estonia, Hungary and Turkey. By the period 2007-
2009 the presence and quality of credit information improved substantially throughout the 
region. Information sharing institutions were introduced in Albania, Croatia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan while their operations were intensified in a 
further 12 countries. We also use an indicator of the legal framework to protect creditors. 
Creditor rights is an index of the legal rights of secured creditors in- and outside insolvency 
of a company and ranges from zero to ten. For the period 2003-2005 this index ranges from 
two in Uzbekistan to nine in Albania, Latvia, and Slovakia. By the period 2007-2009 there 
was a general improvement in creditor rights across the sample, however at a lower scale than 
for credit information sharing. 
At the country-level we control for GDP per capita, consumer price Inflation and the 
share of non-performing loans to total outstanding loans (NPL) in the banking sector of each 
country. The variable NPL captures the extent to which debt overhang in the banking sector, 
especially in the wake of the recent financial crisis may limit the supply of financial services. 
Interestingly, the mean level of non-performing loans across all countries did not increase 
over our observation period (6.9 percent in 2003-2005 versus 6.8 percent in 2007-2009). 
However, this masks significant changes in non-performing loans in both directions in 
individual countries. For example in the Ukraine the level of NPL increased from two percent 
in 2003-2005 to 17 percent in 2007-2009. By contrast, in Poland the level of NPL decreased 
from 18 percent in 2003-2005 to 6 percent in 2007-2009.  
Domestic Inflation should affect the household choice to save in local currency, 
foreign currency or other assets. Moreover if households save in local currency, domestic 
                                                 
13 In unreported robustness tests, we also try the share of adult population covered by a public or private credit 
registry, with qualitatively similar results.  12 
 
inflation should affect whether they save in cash or deposit their money with a bank 
(Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 2000). In our sample of countries CPI inflation varies strongly. 
In 2003-2005 average inflation across all countries was 6.6 percent, ranging from 2 percent in 
the Czech Republic to 16 percent in Belarus. During our observation period average inflation 
increased, reaching an average of 7.8 percent in 2007-2009. 
We include GDP per capita as a measure of aggregate income, as existing evidence 
shows that countries with higher income levels display a broader access to banking services 
(see e.g. Beck et al. 2007). Aggregate income levels differ strongly across our sample. In 
2003-2005 for example average (unweighted) GDP per capita was 4,425$ in our sample, but 
ranged from 313$ in Tajikistan to 16,395$ in Slovenia. Income levels increased by 80 percent 
(in $ terms) in our sample of countries between 2003-2005 and 2007-2009.  
Table 4 Panel A shows significant correlations between the indicators of banking 
services and our indicators of ownership structure, financial infrastructure and 
macroeconomic environment. Here, we present Spearman rank correlations between the 
different indicators, with the use of bank services aggregated on the country-level for 2010. 
We find that the use of bank services is higher in countries with a higher share of foreign-
owned banks,  more generous deposit insurance and higher GDP per capita, while it is lower 
in countries with higher inflation.. The use of mortgages is negatively associated with the 
level of non-performing loans. There are also significant rank correlations between some of 
the country-level factors that we will relate to the use of banking services. There is a negative 
and significant correlation between foreign and state ownership, which can be explained by 
the privatization of state-owned banks to foreign owners in many transition economies. 
Inflation is higher in countries with lower foreign bank ownership, higher state-ownership 
and lower deposit insurance coverage. 13 
 
The Table 4 Panel B rank correlations show that the use of banking services, the 
ownership structure, financial infrastructure and macroeconomic environment are also rank 
correlated over time within countries. Here, we present rank correlations of the differences in 
the country-level variables between 2006 and 2010. We find that increases in the use of 
accounts are significantly correlated with increases in the use of cards and mortgages, while 
changes in the use of cards and mortgages are not significantly correlated with each other. 
We also find that the privatization of state-owned banks is significantly rank correlated with 
increases in the use of banking services. Few of the other rank correlations are significant.  
 
Table 4 here 
 
3.  Methodology 
In the first step of our empirical analysis we relate our indicators of banking service 
use Bh,c of household h in country c to characteristics of the household Xh controlling for 
country level determinants with country-fixed effects αc: 
c h h c c h X B , 1 , ε β α + + =
         ( 1 )  
We run regression (1) separately for the 2006 and the 2010 data as well as on a pooled 
sample, including a dummy variable LITS 2010 for observations from the 2010 wave of the 
survey. We run regression (1) as a probit regression, with error terms clustered at the country-
level to control for possible correlation between error terms across households within 
countries.  
We expect that urban households, households with higher income, households with 
formal employment and households with higher education levels are more likely to use 
banking services. By contrast we expect that households which rely on self-employment and 
transfer income are less likely to use banking services than households with wage income. 14 
 
We expect households with male heads to be more likely to use formal banking services. 
Households which do not speak an official language are hypothesized to be less likely to have 
a bank account. Finally, we expect that Muslim households are less likely to use banking  
services. Grosjean (2011) shows that regions in South-East Europe which were under the 
influence of the Ottoman Empire, and thus the religious based prohibition of interest-lending 
persisted longer, show a significant lower level of financial development. 
In the second step of our empirical analysis, we exploit the time dimension of our 
data (i.e. repeated cross-section) and relate changes in the use of banking services to an array 
of country-level variables:  
,, 1 , 2 , ,,   hct c ht ct hct BX Z αβ β ε =+ + +        ( 2 )  
where Zc,t is a vector of time-varying country-level indicators. Controlling for country-fixed 
effects and household characteristics (and thus for changes in sample composition between 
2006 and 2010), we gauge the relationship between changes in country-level factors and 
changes in the likelihood of using banking services. As in regression (1), we run this 
regression as probit model and allow for clustering on the country level.  
As discussed above, the literature has made different predictions about the 
relationship between ownership structure of the banking system and the use of banking 
services. On the one hand, foreign-owned banks have superior technologies and 
organizational structures enabling them to reach out to a larger share of the population. On 
the other hand, they might cherry-pick and focus on the most profitable segments of the 
population, ultimately reducing access to financial services. While state-owned banks often 
have the explicit mandate to foster broad access to finance, inefficiencies and mission drift 
might prevent them from doing so. More generous deposit insurance can increase trust in the 
banking system, but can also undermine this trust if the consequent moral hazard risk results 
in more aggressive risk taking by banks and ultimately higher bank fragility (Cull et al., 15 
 
2005). More effective systems of credit information sharing and stronger creditor rights are 
expected to increase the use of bank cards and mortgages, as it reduces the costs of these 
products.  
In the final step of our analysis we examine how the structure of bank-ownership in 
each country as well as the development of the financial infrastructure affect the use of 
banking services across different household types. Specifically, we focus on the interaction of 
our indicators of bank-ownership and financial infrastructure (Foreign banks, State banks, 
Deposit insurance, Credit information, Creditor rights)  with selected household-level 
explanatory variables (Urban, Expenses, University degree, Formal employed). We focus on 
these specific household characteristics as theory makes specific predictions about the 
relationship between ownership and infrastructure, on the one hand, and use by population 
groups with these characteristics, on the other hand. We control for level effects across 
countries as well as time effects with country-year fixed effects.  
t c h t h t c t h t c t c h X Z X B , , , , 2 , 1 , , ,   * ε β β α + + + =        ( 3 )  
As before, we allow for clustering of error terms on the country-level, but estimate 
regression (3) with a linear probability model due to the difficulty of interpreting the marginal 
effects of interaction terms in non-linear models (Ai and Norton, 2003).
14 By including 
country-year dummies, we focus on the relationship between the country-level factors and the 
composition of the banked population, controlling for changes in these relationships over 
time. We also control for the interaction of these household characteristics with GDP per 
capita so as not to mix up compositional effects of aggregate income levels with those of our 
financial sector variables.  
Based on the hypothesis that foreign banks cherry pick clients in host countries, we 
expect that foreign bank ownership may encourage the use of banking services particularly 
                                                 
14 In unreported regressions, we confirm our findings qualitatively using probit regressions.  16 
 
among urban, wealthy, formally employed, and better educated households. By contrast, if 
state-owned banks contribute to a broader access of financial services we expect that rural 
households and lower-income households benefit particularly from state-bank presence.  
  Our predictions concerning the relationship between our indicators of financial 
infrastructure and the use of bank services are ambiguous. Lower income households might 
be more likely to open bank accounts in countries with a higher deposit insurance coverage. 
Alternatively, it might be richer, wealthier and better educated segments of the population 
who are informed about deposit insurance and are hence attracted to banks in countries with 
higher deposit insurance coverage. We predict that in countries with better credit information 
sharing and creditor rights the costs and risk for banks to reach out to more marginal 
segments of the population might be reduced. On the demand side, however, improved 
creditor protection could encourage the use of credit by households with formal employment 
and higher income which may be more likely to use external finance to invest and smooth 
consumption.  
 
4.  Results 
A.  Household determinants of the use of bank services 
Table 5 reports univariate results for household determinants of banking service use. We 
compare characteristics of those households with a bank account to those of households 
without an account, as well as those with and without a bank card and those with and without 
a mortgage. Panel A reports differences for the 2006 and Panel B for the 2010 wave of LITS. 
These sub-sample comparisons confirm our main predictions. Households with a bank 
account, a bank card or a mortgage are more often located in urban areas, have higher 
incomes, and more often have university education. Also as expected, households that use 
banking services are less often self-employed, rely less on transfer income, are more likely to 17 
 
speak an official language, and are less likely to be Muslim. Finally, households that use 
banking services, are smaller, have a younger household head and are more likely to be 
headed by a male. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
Many of the differences between households which use banking services and those that 
do not are not only statistically, but also economically significant. For example, using data 
for 2006 in Panel A of Table 5, we find that households with a bank account have average 
household expenses of 3,429 USD per year compared to just 1,306 USD for households 
without a bank account. In 26 percent of the households with a bank account the responding 
adult has university education, while 50 percent of these households have formal 
employment. The corresponding shares for households without a bank account are just 17 
percent for university education and 27 percent for formal employment. Further, while only 8 
percent of the households with a bank account are Muslim, this is the case for 30 percent of 
the households without a bank account. Comparing Panel B to Panel A in Table 5 we find 
that the characteristics of those households which use banks as compared to those that do not 
has hardly changed over time. 
While our univariate comparisons show a clear difference between the banked and the 
unbanked population, many of the household and individual characteristics are correlated 
with each other. What then drives the use of banking services – income, economic activity, 
education, geography, social integration, or religion? To answer this question, we turn to 
multivariate analysis. Table 6 displays marginal effects of probit estimates for the dependant 
variables Account (columns 1-3), Card (columns 4-6) and Mortgage (columns 7-9). The 
standard errors in each model account for clustering at the country-level and include country-18 
 
fixed effects. For each dependent variable, we first report a regression for the 2006 wave of 
LITS, then for the 2010 wave and finally for both samples together, including a dummy 
variable for 2010. The overall fit of our model is reasonably good, with Pseudo R
2 ranging 
from 0.13 to 0.45. While a large share of this can be attributed to country-fixed effects, 
regressions without the country-fixed effects also yield good fits. For example, omitting 
country fixed effects yields a Pseudo R
2 of 0.27 for the model presented in column (1) of 
Table 6.  
 
Table 6 here 
 
The Table 6 results confirm that the use of banking services is significantly related to 
household location, income, wealth, economic activity and religion. The reported estimates in 
columns (3), (6) and (9) suggest that urban households are four percent more likely to have a 
bank account, seven percent more likely to have a bank card and two percent more likely to 
have a mortgage than rural households. Raising household expenses by one standard 
deviation in 2006 increases the probability of having a bank account by roughly 16 percent, 
that of having a bank card by 13 percent and that of having a mortgage by 0.9 percent. 
Households that rely on transfer income are 10 percent (12 percent) less likely to have a bank 
account (card), while there is no significant relationship with mortgage use. After controlling 
for household location and income, self-employed households are not less likely to have a 
bank account or mortgage than households with wage income, but are eight percent less 
likely to have a card, suggesting that such products are more often offered to households with 
wage income. 
Controlling for other household characteristics, larger households are more likely to use 
banking services, which is contrary to our univariate comparisons in Table 5. Households 19 
 
with an older head are less likely to have a bank account (but only in 2010), a card or a 
mortgage. Finally, households with a male head are three (six) percent more likely to have a 
bank account (mortgage), but not more likely to have a bank card.
15 
Controlling for household income and economic activity, households with a university 
graduate are 13 percent more likely to have a bank account, nine percent more likely to have 
a bank card and two percent more likely to have a mortgage. These results suggest that 
literacy (and thus maybe also financial literacy) affects the use of banking services.
16 
Households with an adult who has formal employment are eight (nine) percent more likely to 
have a bank account (card), but not more likely to have a mortgage. Finally, our multivariate 
results suggest that there is a significant impact of social integration and religion on the use of 
banking services. Not speaking the official language reduces the likelihood of having a bank 
account (card) by seven (five) percent, while being a Muslim reduces the probability of 
having a bank account / card by eight and seven percent, respectively. Neither of the two 
variables enters significantly in the mortgage regression.  
The dummy variable LITS 2010 reported in columns (3, 6, 9) shows whether, controlling 
for changes in household characteristics and survey composition, the use of bank services 
increased between 2006 and 2010. We find that households were seven percent more likely to 
have a card and four percent more likely to have a mortgage in 2010 than in 2006, while there 
is no significant difference for the use of bank accounts. These findings suggest that while the 
access to basic banking services has not improved over time, the scope of available banking 
services has. 
In unreported robustness tests – available on request – we test whether the relationship 
between the different household characteristics and the use of bank services vary between the 
                                                 
15 The results on gender are different from the findings of Atiero, Beck and Iacovone (2011) for Southern and 
Eastern Africa.  
16 See van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2007) and Lusardi (2008) for U.S. and Dutch based evidence on the link 
between financial literacy and financial market participation 20 
 
2006 and the 2010 waves of LITS. Specifically, we re-ran models (3), (6) and (9) of Table 6, 
interacting all variables with a 2010 dummy. Few of the interaction terms are significant. 
Households with a university graduate are less likely to have an account in 2010 than in 
2006, though the overall effect is still positive (Table 6, column 2). Self-employed are even 
less likely to have a card in 2010 than in 2006. Finally, male-headed households are more 
likely to have a mortgage in 2010, but not in 2006. All other relationships between household 
characteristics and the use of banking services do not differ significantly between the 2006 
and the 2010 waves, a results that supports the robustness of our findings.  
How robust are our household-level results across countries? To check the robustness of 
our results we replicate model 3 of Table 6 for each country separately. The results displayed 
in Table 7 suggest that the positive relation between the use of a bank account and household 
income and household education are highly robust. While we find substantial variation in the 
economic magnitude of their effect, household Expenses yield a highly significant coefficient 
in each of our country-specific regressions except for Estonia and Tajikistan. Similarly, our 
indicator of education (University degree) is significant at the 10 percent level in 24 of the 29 
regressions. By contrast, the effects of household location (Urban), economic activity 
(Formal employed), transfer income receivers, demographic structure (Size, Age, Male), 
social status (Language) and religion (Muslim) are less robust across countries.
17   
 
Table 7 here 
 
  
                                                 
17 The estimates for some countries are imprecise, due to the fact that the prevalence of bank accounts is either 
very low (less than 10% in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) or very high 
(more than 90%  in Slovenia and Estonia). Several variables are dropped from the country-specific probit 
regressions as they perfectly predict the outcome.  21 
 
B.  Bank-ownership, financial infrastructure, and the use of banking services over time 
This section explores how changes in bank ownership, deposit insurance and creditor 
protection affect the share of households which use banking services. Exploiting the fact that 
we have two survey waves at different points in time, we can relate the within-country 
variation in the use of banking services to within-country variation in our financial sector 
indicators by controlling for country fixed effects and changes in the composition of the 
sample, using regression model (2). 
Before presenting regression results, we briefly discuss some ocular econometrics, as 
presented in Figures 1 – 3. Here we plot the changes in the use of bank accounts, cards and 
mortgages against changes in our different country-level variables.  
 
Figures 1-3 here 
 
  Figure 1 shows that changes in foreign bank ownership are positively associated with 
changes in the use of bank accounts and cards, but hardly associated with changes in the use 
of mortgages. Changes in state ownership are negatively associated with changes in the use 
of accounts, cards and mortgages, suggesting that the privatization of state banks has gone 
hand in hand with an increase in the share of banked households. Figure 2 shows that changes 
in deposit insurance coverage are negatively associated with the use of accounts and cards, 
while there is no consistent relationship between changes in creditor rights or credit 
information sharing and changes in the use of cards or mortgages. Figure 3 shows that 
changes in NPL are negatively associated with the use of bank accounts and cards, but not 
with the use of mortgages. Inflation is hardly associated with changes in the use of banking 
services. Changes in GDP per capita seems to be negatively (though statistically not 22 
 
significantly) associated with changes in the use of bank accounts and mortgages but 
positively with changes in the use of cards. 
  Table 8 presents a multivariate analysis of the relation between changes in bank-
ownership, deposit insurance and creditor protection and changes in the use of banking 
services over time. Here, we control for country-fixed effects and the same household 
characteristics as in Table 5. The coefficient estimates on the country-level indicators thus 
measure the within-country relationship between use of financial services and our country-
level indicators, controlling for sample composition. For each dependent variable we first 
present a specification including our indicators of bank ownership and macroeconomic 
controls. We then present a specification adding selected indicators of the financial 
infrastructure: For the dependent variable Account, we include deposit insurance, but not 
credit information or creditor rights. For the dependent variable Card, we include our 
measures of deposit insurance as well as those of creditor protection which may affect the use 
of credit cards. For the dependent variable Mortgage we employ credit information and 
creditor rights, but not deposit insurance, as the latter should only affect deposit behavior. 
Across all regressions, we also include the share of non-performing loans in total loans as 
gauge of the severity of the crisis. While Panel A uses the full sample, Panel B reports 
subsample analyses in an attempt to control for  demand and supply effects. 
 
Table 8 here 
 
The Table 8 Panel A regression results confirm that changes in bank ownership impact on 
the use of banking services. Our key finding is that a reduction in state ownership of banks is 
associated with a significant increase in the use of bank accounts, bank cards and mortgages. 
The impact of bank privatization on the use of bank accounts, bank cards and mortgages is 23 
 
not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant. Our results suggest that the 
reduction of state ownership of Albanian banks from 21 percent in 2003-2005 to 0 percent in 
2007-2009 increased the use of bank accounts, bank cards and mortgages by 15, 14 and 8 
percent respectively. Between 2006 and 2010 the observed increases in the use of banking 
services in Albania are 27 percent for bank accounts, 15 percent for bank cards and 27 
percent for mortgages, so that the privatization process can explain a large share of this 
increased use of banking services.  
Foreign bank ownership, is not significantly associated with the use of bank accounts or 
mortgages, but is positively associated with the use of bank cards. The impact of foreign bank 
ownership on the use of bank cards is also sizeable. Our results suggest that the increase in 
the market share of foreign banks in Macedonia from 49 percent in 2003-2005 to 90 percent 
in 2007-2009 is associated with an increase in the use of bank cards by 20 percent. This 
corresponds to half of the actual increase in the use of cards in this country between 2006 and 
2010.  
Our multivariate results suggest that there is no consistent relationship between changes 
in the financial infrastructure and the use of banking services. Deposit insurance coverage is 
not significantly associated with the use of bank accounts or cards, while the quality of credit 
information systems is not significantly associated with the use of cards or mortgages. 
Creditor rights are – surprisingly – negatively and significantly associated with the use of 
cards.  
Considering our macroeconomic controls we find a negative relationship between 
changes in non-performing loans, i.e. the severity of the financial crisis, and the use of bank 
accounts, bank cards and mortgages, though the coefficient does not enter significantly for 
bank cards. Inflation, is significantly and positively associated with the use of accounts and 24 
 
cards, but not with the use of mortgages. Finally, we find a strong and significant relationship 
between GDP per capita and the use of mortgages, but not with the use of accounts or cards.  
The significant effects of bank privatization and foreign bank market share observed in 
Panel A of Table 8 may be driven by reverse causality: Foreign banks may increase their 
presence and activities in countries where they expect an increase in demand for advanced 
financial services, such as credit cards. Likewise, governments may privatize banks in 
countries where an anticipated increase in the demand for financial services makes  a 
successful privatization more likely. In Panel B of Table 8 we use subsample analyses to 
account for reverse causality due to anticipated demand. First, we limit our sample to 
households that have a bank account, and thus demonstrate a demand for financial services, 
and test for the relationship between household and country-level variables and the use of 
bank cards and mortgages (Columns 1 and 2). This sample restriction focuses on the supply 
of financial services in addition to a simple bank account. We continue to find that foreign 
bank ownership is positively and significantly associated with the use of bank cards, while 
the share of government-owned banks is negatively and significantly associated with the use 
of mortgages by home owners. 
 Our second approach to control for financial service demand at the household level is to 
limit our sample to households that express a high level of trust in financial institution. The 
LITS survey elicits households’ trust in a range of political institutions, non-governmental 
organizations (NGO’s), law enforcing agencies, as well as “banks and the financial system”. 
We restrict our sample to those households which report a higher level of trust in the banks 
and the financial system than their average trust level in political institutions, NGO’ and law 
enforcement institutions of their home country (Columns 3 to 5). In these specifications we 
again find that the foreign bank share is associated with a higher use of bank cards, while a 
higher share of government-owned banks is associated with lower use of bank accounts, bank 25 
 
cards and mortgages. Together, these results suggest that the correlation between changes in 
bank ownership and the increased use of banking services is not primarily driven by 
(anticipated) demand but rather by supply side effects.   
 
C.  Bank-ownership, financial infrastructure, and the composition of the banked 
population 
The results displayed in Table 7 show that the use of bank services across households 
displays strong country-specific patterns. These differences in the composition of banked 
households may be related to the large differences in economic development (GDP per 
capita) across our sample of countries. They may, however, also be driven by differences in 
the ownership structure of the banking sector, as well as the financial infrastructure. Our  
previous results focus on the relationship between the level of bank ownership, the financial 
infrastructure and household use of banking services (using within-country variation). Bank 
ownership, deposit insurance, credit information sharing or creditor rights may, however, also 
have an impact on the composition of the banked population. In this section, we focus on four 
household characteristics and gauge whether bank ownership and the  financial sector 
infrastructure have a differential impact on urban, richer, better educated and formally 
employed households, using regression model (3). Tables 9 and 10 report the results. In all 
specifications we control for the main effect of all household level characteristics employed 
in Table 5, as well as country-year fixed effects. The latter allow us to focus on the cross-
sectional compositional effects of bank ownership and the financial infrastructure, while 
making full use of our repeated cross-section data. Our variables of interest in this section are 
the interaction terms of Foreign banks, State banks, Deposit insurance, Credit information 
and Creditor rights with the household characteristics  Urban, Expenses, University degree, 
and Formal employed .  26 
 
 
Table 9 here 
 
The results in Table 9 provide some evidence for cherry picking behavior by foreign 
banks. Specifically, households where the respondent is formally employed are more likely to 
use a bank account, a card or a mortgage in countries with higher shares of foreign banks. We 
also find that households with higher income and where the respondent has a university 
degree are more likely to have a mortgage in countries with a higher share of foreign banks. 
To assess the economic relevance of these compositional effects compare for example the 
impact of being formal employed in Slovenia with 21 percent foreign bank assets to Croatia 
with 91 percent foreign bank assets. Our estimates suggest that a household with formal 
employment is not more likely to have a bank account than a household without formal 
employment in Slovenia, while in Croatia households with formal employment are 10 
percentage points more likely to have a bank account than those without. 
We find hardly any evidence for the hypothesis that state-bank ownership leads to more 
inclusive financial sectors. Poorer or rural households are not more likely to have a bank 
account, a card or a mortgage in countries with a higher share of state-owned banks. We do, 
however, find that the use of bank cards and mortgages is less conditional on household 
education levels in countries with more state-owned banks.  
Finally, we find that economic development (as proxied by GDP per capita) benefits 
mostly richer and urban households where the respondent has a university degree and is 
formally employed.  
  The Table 10 regressions suggest that in countries with more generous deposit 
insurance coverage urban households and households with formal employment are more 
likely to have a bank account or card. Again to assess the economic relevance of these effects 27 
 
compare Poland where deposit insurance is 3 times GDP per capita to neighboring Ukraine 
where deposit insurance is only 20 percent of GDP per capita. Our estimates suggest that 
urban households are not more likely to have a bank account than rural households in 
Ukraine, whereas the rural-urban gap is 3 percentage points in Poland. In unreported 
regressions, we confirm our findings on the role of deposit insurance using a dummy variable 
indicating the existence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme. 
  The Table 10 regressions show no effects of credit information sharing on the 
composition of the banked population, while creditor rights have a limited effect on the type 
of households which are banked. Households where the respondent is formally employed or 
has a university degree are more likely to have a bank card in countries with stronger creditor 
rights. However, this effect is not confirmed for the use of mortgages.   
 
Table 10 here 
 
  Overall, the results in Tables 9 and 10 suggest that bank ownership and the 
development of the financial infrastructure do have compositional effects on the banked 
population. Our results are consistent with hypotheses that see foreign banks cherry-picking 
their clients rather than broadening access. By contrast they provide very little support to the 
hypothesis that state bank ownership broadens the use of financial services to marginalized 
groups. We find no evidence to support the hypothesis that financial infrastructure 
improvements mainly benefit previously unbanked groups. On the contrary, if anything 
generous deposit insurance coverage and improved creditor protection seem to mostly 




5.  Conclusions 
This paper explores the characteristics of households which use deposit, payment and 
credit services in transition countries and relates the level and composition of the banked 
population across countries to variations in bank ownership, deposit insurance and creditor 
protection. Using data across 28 transition economies and Turkey, we find a strong 
correlation of household location, income, economic activity and education with the use of 
banking services. We find evidence that the use of banking services is higher in countries 
where banks have been privatized and the market share of foreign banks has increased. 
Foreign bank ownership seems to encourage the use of bank services among households with 
formal employment, better education and higher income. By contrast, poorer households are 
not more likely to be banked in countries with higher shares of state-bank ownership. Our 
results further suggest that generous deposit insurance and better creditor protection mainly 
attract urban and richer segments of the population to the banking system.  
Our result on the compositional effects of foreign bank ownership on the use of bank 
services are consistent with Beck and Martinez Peria (2010) who show for Mexico a 
reorientation of foreign entrants towards urban and richer areas of the country. Our finding 
that state ownership of banks does not lead to more inclusion of poorer households and 
household without formal employment provides support to the existing empirical literature 
(La Porta et al., 2002) suggesting a mission drift of these banks.  
Our results shed doubt on the ability of structural policy to broaden the financial system 
to disadvantaged groups. Specifically, attempts to broaden the use of financial services 
through liberalization of the banking sector or more generous deposit insurance do not 
increase the likelihood that poorer, less educated and rural segments of the population use 
formal financial services. Similarly, a better contractual and information framework does not 
seem to foster financial inclusion. Our results do not imply that these policies do not foster 29 
 
financial sector development, rather that it is difficult to target this development to certain 
groups.  
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 This figure plots the change in the country mean of Account, Card and Mortgage (2010 minus 2006) against the change in the country-level variables Foreign banks and State 
banks (all 2007-2009 minus 2003-2005). All variables are defined in Table 1.
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State banksFigure 2.  Change in financial insfrastructure and use of bank services
This figure plots the change in the country mean of Card and Account or Mortgage (2010 minus 2006) against the change in the country-level variables Deposit insurance,




































































































































































































































































-1 0 1 2 3
Creditor rightsFigure 3.  Change in macreconomic conditions and household use of bank services
This figure plots the change in the country mean of Account, Card and Mortgage (2010 minus 2006) against the change in the country-level variables NPL, Inflation and GDP
















































































































































































































































































































































































.4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4
GDP per capitaVariable name Definition Source Period of observation
Account Dummy=1 if a household member has a bank account, =0 otherwise LITS 2006; 2010
Card Dummy=1 if a household member has a debit or credit card, =0 otherwise LITS 2006; 2010
Mortgage Dummy=1 if the household owns its own dwelling and financed it mainly with a mortgage, =0 otherwise LITS 2006; 2010
Urban Dummy =1 if household lives in an urban or metropolitan area, =0 otherwise LITS 2006; 2010
Expenses Household equivalized expenses using OECD scales in USD per year (Log) LITS 2006; 2010
Self employed Dummy =1 if main household income source is self-employment or farming, =0 otherwise LITS 2006; 2010
Transfer receiver Dummy =1 if main household income source is state or private transfer , =0 otherwise LITS 2006; 2010
Size Number of household members (adults & children) LITS 2006; 2010
Age Age of the household head in log years LITS 2006; 2010
Male Dummy =1 if household head is male, =0 if household head is female LITS 2006; 2010
Household-level data




University degree Dummy=1 if respondent has a university degree, =0 otherwise LITS 2006; 2010
Formal employed Dummy =1 if respondent had formal labor contract in past 12 months , =0 otherwise LITS 2006; 2010
Language Dummy =1 if respondent speaks an official national language =0 otherwise LITS 2006; 2010
Muslim Dummy =1 if respondent is muslim, =0 otherwise LITS 2006; 2010
Credit / GDP  Private credit in % of GDP EBRD 2003-2005;2007-2009
Composite Composite index of access to financial services Honohan various
Foreign banks Assets share of foreign controlled banks in domestic banking system, in % EBRD 2003-2005; 2007-2009
State banks Assets share of state controlled banks in domestic banking system, in % EBRD 2003-2005; 2007-2009
Deposit insurance Deposit insurance coverage / per capita GDP DKL, IADI 2003; 2007
Credit information Information sharing index (scale: 0= worst , 6=best) DB 2003-2005; 2007-2009
Creditor rights Legal rights index for secured creditors (scale: 0= worst , 6=best) DB 2003-2005; 2007-2009
NPL Non performing loans (%) EBRD 2003-2005; 2007-2009
Inflation CPI inflation (in %) EBRD 2003-2005; 2007-2009
GDP per capita Per capita GDP in log USD EBRD 2003-2005; 2007-2009
Sources: LITS: EBRD Life in Transition survey. EBRD: EBRD (2009). DB: www.doingbusiness.org. CGAP: www.cgap.org/financialindicators. DKL: Deminrgüc-Kunt, Karacaovalli & 
Laeven (2005). Honohan: Honohan (2008). IADI: International Association of Deposit Insurers: www.iadi.org.
Access to finance
Bank ownership, financial infrastrure and macroeconomic conditions
Country-level data
Respondent characteristicsComposite (in %)
Period 2006 2010 Test 2006 2010 Test 2006 2010 Test 2003‐2005 2007‐2009 various
Albania 0.18 0.45 *** 0.17 0.32 *** 0.03 0.30 *** 11 34 34
Armenia 0.04 0.10 ** 0.04 0.13 ** 0.01 0.06 *** 7 18 9
Azerbaijan 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.43 *** 0.00 0.01 8 16 17
Belarus 0.15 0.16 0.23 0.23 *** 0.04 0.06 14 30 16
Bosnia 0.40 0.47 0.29 0.26 * 0.03 0.13 *** 28 49 17
Bulgaria 0.18 0.29 0.42 0.51 0.07 0.20 *** 34 70 56
Croatia 0.80 0.73 *** 0.76 0.73 *** 0.09 0.18 *** 55 68 42
Czech Rep 0.79 0.89 0.61 0.75 *** 0.17 0.19 33 49 85
Estonia 09 4 08 9*** 08 2 09 0*** 01 1 01 4 42 95 86
This table reports means for each variable by country and observation period. The means for the variables Account, Card, Mortgage are adjusted for sampling weights in the LITS surveys. The
column Test reports the coeffcient of the dummy variable LITS 2010 (1 for observations from the 2010 survey, 0 otherwise) in a regression of Account, Card, or Mortgage on household
characteristics using pooled 2006 and 2010 observations per country. See Table 7 for details. Definitions and sources of the variables are provided in Table 1.
Table 2.  Use of banking services by country
Account (share) Credit / GDP (in %) Card (share) Mortgage (share)
Estonia 0.94 0.89 *** 0.82 0.90 *** 0.11 0.14 42 95 86
Georgia 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.22 *** 0.01 0.04 11 29 15
Hungary 0.64 0.58 ** 0.50 0.56 *** 0.29 0.35 ** 45 64 66
Kazakhstan 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.03 0.05 * 28 54 48
Kyrgyzstan 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 7 14 1
Latvia 0.74 0.75 0.71 0.70 0.08 0.06 53 94 64
Lithuania 0.69 0.76 * 0.53 0.50 *** 0.07 0.08 31 64 70
Macedonia 0.20 0.60 *** 0.14 0.54 *** 0.03 0.07 22 41 20
Moldova 0.09 0.06 ** 0.10 0.14 0.03 0.05 * 7 0 13
Mongolia 0.32 0.50 *** 0.10 0.23 *** 0.02 0.08 *** 20 27 25
Montenegro 0.29 0.47 *** 0.21 0.36 *** 0.01 0.09 *** 17 85 .
Poland 0.66 0.70 0.43 0.40 *** 0.09 0.13 *** 31 52 66
Romania 0.27 0.21 *** 0.35 0.38 0.09 0.16 *** 16 38 23
Russia 0.31 0.23 *** 0.21 0.31 *** 0.04 0.03 24 41 69
Serbia 0.57 0.67 *** 0.42 0.43 0.04 0.13 *** 26 41 .
Slovak Rep 0.79 0.92 0.48 0.71 0.11 0.17 32 46 83
Slovenia 0.97 0.96 * 0.75 0.75 *** 0.09 0.12 * 49 86 97
Tajikistan 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 18 26 16
Turkey 0.25 0.41 *** 0.31 0.70 *** 0.01 0.07 * 18 32 49
Ukraine 0.15 0.08 *** 0.18 0.26 *** 0.02 0.03 * 27 68 24
Uzbekistan 0.04 0.01 *** 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.02 25 15 16
Mean 0.37 0.42 0.31 0.40 0.06 0.10 25 46 42Variable name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Account 28133 0.36 0.48 0 1 31540 0.42 0.49 0 1
Card 28129 0.30 0.46 0 1 31540 0.40 0.49 0 1
Mortgage 25058 0.05 0.22 0 1 27683 0.10 0.30 0 1
Urban 28153 0.57 0.49 0 1 31544 0.59 0.49 0 1
Expenses 28089 7.48 0.91 1.0 10.3 29579 7.86 0.89 1.7 11.4
Self employed 28153 0.17 0.38 0 1 31544 0.17 0.38 0 1
Transfer receiver 28153 0.34 0.48 0 1 31544 0.32 0.47 0 1
Size 28153 3.28 1.83 1 12 31544 3.09 1.71 1 12
Age 28149 3.89 0.33 2.9 4.6 31381 3.88 0.33 2.9 4.8
Male 28153 0.70 0.46 0 1 31396 0.60 0.49 0 1
University degree 28146 0.19 0.39 0 1 31544 0.20 0.40 0 1
Formal employed 28153 0.32 0.47 0 1 31525 0.37 0.48 0 1
Lang age 28124 09 4 02 3 0 1 31543 09 3 02 5 0 1
Survey year: 2006 Survey year: 2010
Panel A. Household-level data
Table 3. Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics for each variable by observation period. The means for the household level variables are not
adjusted for sampling weights in the LITS surveys. Definitions and sources of the variables are provided in Table 1.
Language 28124 0.94 0.23 0 1 31543 0.93 0.25 0 1
Muslim 28123 0.23 0.42 0 1 30884 0.24 0.43 0 1
Variable name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Foreign banks 29 50.3 31.5 4.3 98.3 28 62.2 31.2 6.6 98.4
State banks 29 15.8 19.8 0.0 69.0 28 11.4 17.5 0.0 77.2
Deposit insurance 29 2.1 2.6 0.0 10.0 29 1.9 2.2 0.0 10.0
Credit information 29 2.4 1.9 0.0 5.0 29 3.8 1.6 0.0 6.0
Creditor rights 29 5.9 2.0 2.0 9.0 29 6.3 2.2 2.0 10.0
NPL 27 6.9 6.1 0.3 28.2 27 6.8 4.0 1.9 17.2
Inflation 29 6.6 4.1 0.6 15.9 29 7.8 4.2 2.8 17.1
GDP per capita 29 8.0 1.0 5.7 9.7 29 8.7 0.9 6.6 10.1
Panel B. Country-level data
Period: 2003 - 2005 Period 2007 -2009[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
[1] Account 1
[2] Card 0.83 *1
[3] Mortgage 0.68 *0 . 6 1 * 1
[4] Foreign banks 0.54 *0 . 4 1 *0.65 * 1
[5] State banks -0.20 0.03 -0.35 -0.67 * 1
[6] Deposit insurance 0.27 0.38 0.41 * 0.14 -0.05 1
[7] Credit information 0.14 0.26 0.28 0.29 -0.25 0.12 1
[8] Creditor rights 0.15 0.18 0.31 0.42 * -0.18 0.06 -0.27 1
[9] NPL 02 6 03 3 04 0* 01 0 01 3 02 9 03 0 01 9 1
This table reports Spearman rank correlations for the country mean of Account, Card, Mortgage and our country level explanatory variables. The means for the variables Account, Card, Mortgage are adjusted 
for sampling weights in the LITS survey. * indicates significance at the .05 level. Definitions and sources of the variables are provided in Table 1.
Table 4. Country-level variables and use of banking services - Pairwise correlations
Panel A.  Cross sectional correlations
This panel reports rank correlations for 2010 means of Account, Card, Mortgage and 2007-2009 means of our country level explanatory variables.
[9] NPL -0.26 -0.33 -0.40 * -0.10 -0.13 -0.29 -0.30 0.19 1
[10] Inflation -0.70 * -0.58 * -0.74 * -0.73 * 0.37 -0.48 * -0.07 -0.29 0.27 1
[11] GDP per capita 0.81 * 0.85 * 0.57 * 0.30 0.08 0.23 0.28 0.03 -0.38 * -0.54 * 1
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
[1] Account 1
[2] Card 0.41 * 1
[3] Mortgage 0.41 * 0.19 1
[4] Foreign banks 0.21 0.36 0.15 1
[5] State banks -0.38 -0.41 * -0.44 * -0.25 1
[6] Deposit insurance -0.40 * -0.09 -0.33 0.01 0.03 1
[7] Credit information -0.19 0.10 -0.15 -0.06 0.31 0.03 1
[8] Creditor rights -0.24 -0.16 0.30 0.23 -0.02 0.13 0.06 1
[9] NPL -0.20 -0.09 -0.06 0.22 0.03 0.20 0.30 0.12 1
[10] Inflation 0.13 0.05 -0.28 -0.18 0.08 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.12 1
[11] GDP per capita -0.09 0.05 -0.33 0.13 0.08 0.49 * 0.43 * 0.15 0.28 0.51 * 1
Panel B.  Correlations of changes over time
This panel reports rank correlations for changes in the means of Account, Card, Mortgage (2010 minus 2006) and changes in the means of our country level explanatory variables (2007-2009 minus 2005-2005).All Households
yes no Sample test yes no Sample test yes no Sample test
Urban 0.60 0.69 0.55 *** 0.73 0.54 *** 0.81 0.56 ***
Expenses 7.53 8.14 7.17 *** 8.20 7.23 *** 8.11 7.45 ***
Self employed 0.17 0.12 0.19 *** 0.11 0.19 *** 0.10 0.18 ***
Transfer receiver 0.35 0.26 0.40 *** 0.19 0.42 *** 0.23 0.37 ***
Size 2.86 2.57 3.02 *** 2.64 2.95 *** 2.64 2.94 ***
Age 38 5 38 1 38 8 *** 37 7 38 7 *** 37 7 38 7 ***
Panel A. LITS 2006
The table reports means for each variable for the full sample as well as for the sub-samples of households with and without a bank account, with and without a
bank card, and with and without a mortgage. All means are adjusted for sample weighting in the LITS survey. The sample tests report the results of linear
independant sample tests which examine whether household characteristics differ for households with and without a bank account, bank card or mortgage. ***, **,
* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Definition and sources of the variables are provided in Table 1.
Table 5.  Household characteristics and the use of banking services - Univariate tests
Household has mortgage Household has bank account Household has bank card
Age 3.85 3.81 3.88 3.77 3.87 3.77 3.87
Male 0.67 0.69 0.66 *** 0.69 0.66 *** 0.69 0.68
University degree 0.20 0.26 0.17 *** 0.28 0.17 *** 0.30 0.20 ***
Formal employed 0.35 0.50 0.27 *** 0.56 0.26 *** 0.52 0.33 ***
Language 0.94 0.96 0.93 *** 0.96 0.94 *** 0.96 0.94 ***
Muslim 0.22 0.08 0.30 *** 0.09 0.28 *** 0.06 0.23 ***
All Households
yes no Sample test yes no Sample test yes no Sample test
Urban 0.59 0.65 0.55 *** 0.68 0.53 *** 0.66 0.55 ***
Expenses 7.85 8.34 7.51 *** 8.30 7.55 *** 8.19 7.78 ***
Self employed 0.18 0.13 0.22 *** 0.12 0.23 *** 0.15 0.19 ***
Transfer receiver 0.31 0.27 0.33 *** 0.24 0.35 *** 0.28 0.33 ***
Size 3.13 2.86 3.33 *** 2.99 3.23 *** 2.96 3.22 ***
Age 3.86 3.84 3.88 *** 3.82 3.88 *** 3.86 3.90 ***
Male 0.60 0.60 0.59 ** 0.60 0.59 ** 0.65 0.59 ***
University degree 0.20 0.22 0.18 *** 0.24 0.17 *** 0.24 0.19 ***
Formal employed 0.37 0.47 0.29 *** 0.49 0.28 *** 0.43 0.35 ***
Language 0.93 0.94 0.92 *** 0.94 0.92 *** 0.95 0.93 ***
Muslim 0.26 0.12 0.36 *** 0.17 0.32 *** 0.18 0.27 ***
Household has bank account Household has bank card Household has mortgage
Panel B. LITS 2010Dependant variable
Survey year 2006 2010 2006,2010 2006 2010 2006,2010 2006 2010 2006,2010
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Urban 0.0594*** 0.026 0.0442*** 0.0812*** 0.0498*** 0.0690*** 0.0262*** 0.0199*** 0.0241***
[0.0149] [0.0190] [0.0133] [0.0151] [0.0167] [0.0141] [0.00316] [0.00738] [0.00417]
Expenses 0.175*** 0.125*** 0.151*** 0.147*** 0.132*** 0.153*** 0.00981*** 0.0190*** 0.0141***
[0.0104] [0.0147] [0.0109] [0.00715] [0.0175] [0.0117] [0.00221] [0.00378] [0.00234]
Self employed 0.020 ‐0.022 0.000 ‐0.0464*** ‐0.105*** ‐0.0777*** ‐0.006 ‐0.005 ‐0.005
[0.0205] [0.0176] [0.0154] [0.0168] [0.0167] [0.0140] [0.00382] [0.00732] [0.00448]
Transfer receiver ‐0.0992*** ‐0.0773*** ‐0.0969*** ‐0.121*** ‐0.107*** ‐0.119*** ‐0.003 ‐0.006 ‐0.00680*
[0 0266] [0 0202] [0 0208] [0 0119] [0 0251] [0 0180] [0 00368] [0 00707] [0 00400]
Table 6. Household characteristics and the use of banking services - Multivariate analysis
The dependent variables in this table are Account (models 1-3), Card (models 4-6) and Mortgage (7-9). All models report marginal effects of probit estimations and
include country fixed effects. Observations are weighted according to sample weighting in the LITS survey. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are adjusted for
clustering at the country level.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. All variables are defined in Table 1.  
Account Card Mortgage
[0.0266] [0.0202] [0.0208] [0.0119] [0.0251] [0.0180] [0.00368] [0.00707] [0.00400]
Size 0.0214*** 0.0197*** 0.0192*** 0.0274*** 0.0326*** 0.0319*** 0.00277*** 0.00328* 0.00244*
[0.00567] [0.00597] [0.00453] [0.00367] [0.00870] [0.00567] [0.000921] [0.00193] [0.00132]
Age ‐ 0.030 ‐0.0656** ‐0.0467** ‐0.0694*** ‐0.0645** ‐0.0783*** ‐0.0324*** ‐0.0426*** ‐0.0384***
[0.0242] [0.0288] [0.0235] [0.0175] [0.0327] [0.0183] [0.00468] [0.0123] [0.00782]
Male 0.0348*** 0.0210* 0.0323*** 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.001 0.00769* 0.00556**
[0.00662] [0.0114] [0.00570] [0.00725] [0.0101] [0.0101] [0.00203] [0.00421] [0.00238]
University degree 0.145*** 0.120*** 0.130*** 0.0915*** 0.0945*** 0.0893*** 0.0104*** 0.0211*** 0.0163***
[0.0132] [0.0179] [0.0147] [0.0146] [0.0138] [0.0139] [0.00322] [0.00701] [0.00367]
Formal employed 0.0749*** 0.0756*** 0.0761*** 0.0798*** 0.103*** 0.0936*** 0.002 0.003 0.004
[0.0130] [0.0182] [0.0119] [0.0101] [0.0148] [0.0105] [0.00262] [0.00392] [0.00262]
Language 0.0741*** 0.0839** 0.0663*** 0.029 0.0505* 0.0470** 0.006 0.015 0.006
[0.0269] [0.0344] [0.0255] [0.0288] [0.0286] [0.0228] [0.00676] [0.0119] [0.00878]
Muslim ‐0.0922*** ‐0.111** ‐0.0802*** ‐0.0653*** ‐0.097 ‐0.0704** ‐0.003 0.003 0.002
[0.0179] [0.0566] [0.0269] [0.0161] [0.0749] [0.0303] [0.00374] [0.0120] [0.00639]
LITS 2010 0.026 0.0731*** 0.0403***
[0.0274] [0.0253] [0.00754]
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Pseudo R2 0.45 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.29 0.33 0.19 0.13 0.15
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Households 28'001 29'176 57'177 27'997 29'176 57'173 24'944 25'717 50'661
# countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29Explanatory variable: Urban Expenses Transfer receiver Male University degree Formal employed Language Muslim LITS 2010 Obs. Pseudo R2
Country
Full sample 0.0442*** 0.151*** ‐0.0969*** 0.0323*** 0.130*** 0.0761*** 0.0663*** ‐0.0802*** 0.0263 57177 0.423
Albania 0.123*** 0.108*** ‐0.134*** 0.006 0.294*** 0.0560* 0.020 ‐0.017 0.241*** 1850 0.21
Armenia 0.004 0.0494*** ‐0.007 0.005 0.0326*** 0.009 0.017 0.0341*** 1949 0.21
Azerbaijan 0.000 0.00602* ‐0.001 0.0284** ‐0.004 ‐0.064 ‐0.002 1448 0.19
Belarus 0.0417** 0.0739*** ‐0.018 0.025 0.0789*** 0.035 0.044 ‐0.014 1715 0.10
Bosnia 0.0612** 0.217*** ‐0.029 0.000 0.035 0.174*** ‐0.0878* ‐0.160*** 0.034 1931 0.14
Bulgaria 0.0890*** 0.152*** ‐0.006 0.0567*** 0.0510** 0.0605** ‐0.150 ‐0.0656** 0.028 1886 0.14
Croatia 0.0537** 0.130*** ‐0.0886*** 0.0432* 0.0817*** 0.0704*** 0.262*** ‐0.097 ‐0.110*** 1890 0.18
Czech Rep 0.024 0.0819*** ‐0.219*** 0.018 0.0488*** 0.0406** 0.020 1887 0.35
Estonia ‐0.0221* 0.010 ‐0.0458** 0.000 0.014 0.009 0.0477*** ‐0.642*** ‐0.0521*** 1900 0.10
Table 7.   Household-level determinants of Account by country
This table reports marginal effects of selected household-level explanatory variables for the dependent variable Account based on regressions by country. The estimated probit model for each country is identical to model
(3) in Table 5 (excluding country fixed effects). Non reported variables included in each regression are Self employed, Size and Age. Observations are weighted according to sample weighting in the LITS survey. ***, **,
* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. All variables are defined in Table 1.  
Georgia 0.006 0.0155*** ‐0.00692* 0.004 0.0127** 0.0176** 0.010 ‐0.001 1918 0.32
Hungary 0.136*** 0.162*** ‐0.180*** 0.028 0.249*** 0.0954*** ‐0.0658** 1902 0.26
Kazakhstan ‐0.006 0.0606*** 0.024 0.006 0.0519*** 0.0284* ‐0.004 ‐0.018 ‐0.0301** 1871 0.07
Kyrgyzstan 0.000 0.00330** 0.000 0.002 0.0149* 0.002 0.00280* ‐0.00945* ‐0.00441** 1953 0.25
Latvia ‐0.0600** 0.151*** ‐0.0989*** 0.007 0.119*** 0.0706*** 0.147*** 0.042 1456 0.23
Lithuania ‐0.0440* 0.191*** 0.042 0.011 0.0776*** 0.0617* 0.254*** 0.015 ‐0.022 1920 0.14
Macedonia 0.107*** 0.205*** ‐0.0639* 0.020 0.0642* 0.0626** 0.052 ‐0.243*** 0.378*** 2022 0.23
Moldova 0.0230* 0.0448*** 0.004 0.005 0.0807*** 0.007 ‐0.001 0.040 ‐0.0345*** 1970 0.14
Mongolia ‐0.0430* 0.186*** ‐0.153*** 0.003 0.129*** 0.035 ‐0.230* 0.066 0.109*** 1917 0.14
Montenegro ‐0.027 0.0882*** ‐0.183*** 0.042 0.123*** ‐0.017 0.182*** 0.026 0.167*** 1887 0.08
Poland 0.0759*** 0.244*** ‐0.0684* ‐0.001 0.171*** 0.165*** 0.125 ‐0.429* 0.009 2245 0.23
Romania 0.130*** 0.125*** 0.012 0.0593*** 0.150*** 0.0551** 0.039 ‐0.0716*** 1969 0.17
Russia 0.013 0.134*** 0.117*** 0.017 0.139*** 0.022 0.008 0.017 ‐0.133*** 2368 0.07
Serbia 0.0850*** 0.0953*** ‐0.144*** 0.0490* 0.173*** 0.138*** 0.111 ‐0.298*** 0.107*** 2412 0.12
Slovak Rep 0.0465*** 0.0905*** ‐0.132*** 0.017 0.027 0.0716*** 0.331** 0.000 1799 0.30
Slovenia ‐0.006 0.0222*** ‐0.004 ‐0.003 0.009 0.008 ‐0.007 ‐0.019 ‐0.0174** 1841 0.10
Tajikistan 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 ‐0.001 0.000 1473 0.42
Turkey 0.0701*** 0.167*** ‐0.0765** 0.030 0.161*** 0.143*** ‐0.086 0.0810*** 1866 0.09
Ukraine 0.013 0.0525*** ‐0.022 0.0283** 0.0368** 0.024 0.015 ‐0.0711*** ‐0.0634*** 2444 0.11
Uzbekistan 0.000 0.0103* ‐0.010 0.002 0.0203* 0.012 0.010 ‐0.009 ‐0.0330*** 2426 0.08Dependant variable
Survey year: 2006,2010 2006,2010 2006,2010 2006,2010 2006,2010 2006,2010
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign banks 0.002 0.002 0.00305* 0.00482*** 0.000 0.000
[0.00152] [0.00151] [0.00162] [0.00143] [0.000389] [0.000300]
State banks ‐0.00725** ‐0.00709** ‐0.00549** ‐0.00716** ‐0.00430*** ‐0.00429***
Table 8. Country-level determinants of use of banking services
The dependent variables in this table are Account, Card and Mortgage. All models use pooled data from the LITS 2006 and 2010
surveys and include a full set of household-level explanatory variables as well as country fixed effects. All models report marginal
effects from probit estimations. Observations are weighted according to sample weighting in the LITS survey. Standard errors are
reported in brackets and are adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level.
All variables are defined in Table 1.  
Account Card Mortgage
Panel A. Full sample estimates
[0.00347] [0.00354] [0.00267] [0.00330] [0.000985] [0.000948]
Deposit insurance ‐0.013 ‐0.006
[0.00867] [0.0176]
Credit information 0.009 0.005
[0.0112] [0.00375]
Creditor rights ‐0.0581*** 0.008
[0.0206] [0.00540]
NPL ‐0.00972*** ‐0.00871*** ‐0.00671* ‐0.006 ‐0.001 ‐0.00133**
[0.00310] [0.00318] [0.00397] [0.00373] [0.000685] [0.000600]
Inflation 0.0144** 0.0152** 0.011 0.0148** 0.00293* 0.002
[0.00653] [0.00628] [0.00769] [0.00641] [0.00172] [0.00174]
GDP per capita ‐0.054 ‐0.066 0.042 0.011 0.0356*** 0.0234**
[0.0416] [0.0464] [0.0391] [0.0460] [0.00972] [0.0113]
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Pseudo R2 0.43 0.43 0.33 0.33 0.16 0.16
Household variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Households 52'339 52'339 52'337 52'337 46'139 46'139
# countries 27 27 27 27 27 27Sample: 
Dependant variable Card Mortgage Account Card Mortgage
Survey year: 2006,2010 2006,2010 2006,2010 2006,2010 2006,2010
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Foreign banks 0.00426** 0.000 0.003 0.00422** 0.000
[0.00205] [0.000580] [0.00199] [0.00192] [0.000447]
State banks ‐0.003 ‐0.00764*** ‐0.00769** ‐0.00673** ‐0.00550***
[0.00361] [0.00201] [0.00344] [0.00293] [0.00118]
Di i **
Households with a bank account Households with a high level of  trust in banks
Panel B. Subsample estimates controlling for financial service demand
In this panel we replicate our estimations from Panel A for the subsample of clients which have a bank account (columns 1-
2) and clients which have a high level of trust in financial institutions (columns 3-5). The latter subsample is defined as those 
clients which have a higher level of trust in "Banks and the financial system" (on a scale of 1-5) than they have on average in  
political institutions, non-governmental organizations and law enforcement agencies of their country.
Deposit insurance ‐0.0438** ‐0.011 0.003
[0.0217] [0.0113] [0.0211]
Credit information ‐0.024 0.005 ‐0.008 0.008
[0.0151] [0.00694] [0.0136] [0.00476]
Creditor rights ‐0.015 0.023 ‐0.026 0.012
[0.0257] [0.0144] [0.0260] [0.00907]
NPL 0.004 ‐0.002 ‐0.00663* ‐0.003 ‐0.00212**
[0.00505] [0.00154] [0.00390] [0.00461] [0.000860]
Inflation 0.007 0.004 0.010 0.011 0.003
[0.00809] [0.00334] [0.00849] [0.00802] [0.00261]
GDP per capita ‐0.093 0.0365* ‐0.047 0.043 0.024
[0.0647] [0.0207] [0.0596] [0.0586] [0.0170]
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
(Pseudo) R2 0.17 0.11 0.44 0.33 0.16
Household variables yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
# Households 20'456 17'431 24'716 24'714 21'600
# countries 27 27 27 27 27Survey year 2006,2010 2006, 2010 2006,2010 2006, 2010 2006,2010 2006, 2010
Dependent variable Account Card Mortgage Account Card Mortgage
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Urban 0.000332 0.000217 0.000145 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000222] [0.000382] [0.000219] [0.000324] [0.000558] [0.000220]
Expenses 0.00023 0.00012 0.000229** 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000369] [0.000375] [0.000101] [0.000434] [0.000440] [0.000150]
The dependent variables in this table are Account (models 1,4), Card (models 2,5) and Mortgage (models 3,6). All models use pooled LITS 2006 and LITS
2010 data. All models report estimates from OLS regressions and include a full set of household level variables as well as country*year fixed effects.
Observations are weighted according to sample weighting in the LITS survey. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are adjusted for clustering at the
country level.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. All variables are defined in Table 1.  
Table 9. Compositional effects of bank ownership
Foreign banks * State banks *
University degree ‐0.000032 0.000406 0.000284* 0.000 ‐0.000822** ‐0.000437***
[0.000403] [0.000315] [0.000156] [0.000377] [0.000389] [0.000147]
Formal employed 0.00144*** 0.00108*** 0.000289* ‐0.001 ‐0.001 0.000
[0.000404] [0.000334] [0.000146] [0.000596] [0.000468] [0.000217]
Urban ‐0.002 0.000 0.010 0.003 0.004 0.0112**
[0.00735] [0.00972] [0.00611] [0.00665] [0.00724] [0.00455]
Expenses 0.0221* 0.0464*** 0.00761*** 0.0248** 0.0480*** 0.0104***
[0.0127] [0.00846] [0.00267] [0.0114] [0.00633] [0.00292]
University degree 0.001 0.0158* 0.0153*** 0.001 0.0184** 0.0177***
[0.0116] [0.00810] [0.00365] [0.00945] [0.00677] [0.00402]
Formal employed 0.003 0.013 0.005 0.020 0.0255** 0.00776*
[0.0116] [0.0119] [0.00367] [0.0117] [0.0118] [0.00389]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 0.47 0.37 0.10 0.47 0.37 0.10
Household variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country*year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Households 55'738 55'734 49'249 55'738 55'734 49'249
# countries 29 29 29 29 29 29
GDP per capita* GDP per capita*Survey year 2006,2010 2006, 2010 2006,2010 2006, 2010 2006,2010 2006, 2010
Dependent variable Account Card Card Mortgage Card Mortgage
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Urban 0.0110*** 0.0121*** 0.00537 0.00185 0.001 0.000
[0.00251] [0.00281] [0.00635] [0.00376] [0.00543] [0.00300]
Expenses 0.00543 0.00610* 0.00235 0.00118 0.000 0.000
[0.00411] [0.00352] [0.00555] [0.00168] [0.00328] [0.00167]
The dependent variables in this table are Account (model 1), and Card (models 2, 3, 5) and Mortgage (models 4,6). All models use pooled
LITS 2006 and LITS 2010 data. All models report estimates from OLS regressions and include a full set of household level variables as well as
country*year fixed effects. Observations are weighted according to sample weighting in the LITS survey. Standard errors are reported in
brackets and are adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. All variables are
defined in Table 1.  
Table 10. Compositional effects of deposit insurance and creditor protection
Credit information* Creditor rights* Deposit insurance*
University degree 0.0016 0.00381 0.000299 0.00276 0.00752* 0.001
[0.00390] [0.00554] [0.00524] [0.00230] [0.00417] [0.00232]
Formal employed 0.00992* 0.00609* 0.00763 0.00134 0.0151*** ‐0.001
[0.00506] [0.00342] [0.00714] [0.00286] [0.00429] [0.00210]
Urban ‐0.003 ‐0.002 ‐0.001 0.010 0.004 0.0119**
[0.00583] [0.00716] [0.0104] [0.00635] [0.00768] [0.00480]
Expenses 0.0243** 0.0472*** 0.0466*** 0.00951*** 0.0498*** 0.0106***
[0.0117] [0.00646] [0.00852] [0.00306] [0.00680] [0.00325]
University degree ‐0.001 0.0172** 0.0197** 0.0157*** 0.0169** 0.0182***
[0.00984] [0.00636] [0.00783] [0.00406] [0.00664] [0.00436]
Formal employed 0.0208* 0.0275** 0.022 0.008 0.0214* 0.00972**
[0.0109] [0.0118] [0.0143] [0.00492] [0.0106] [0.00464]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 0.47 0.37 0.37 0.10 0.37 0.10
Household variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country*year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Households 57'177 57'173 57'173 50'661 57'173 50'661
# countries 29 29 29 29 29 29
GDP per capita * GDP per capita * GDP per capita *